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After finishing a lecture at
the FDNY Division of Training on why the World Trade Center collapsed, a fire
chief who is also engineer came to me and said, "Chief, you were rough on
architects and engineers." That night, I thought of what he said. I
realized there is an edge in my voice when I talk about architects and
engineers and even code officials since the World Trade Center tragedy. Perhaps
he was right.
But then I started thinking
about architects, engineers and building code officials, and building
construction changes I have seen over the past three decades. I then asked
myself, "Are architects, engineers and building code writers friends of
the firefighter?" I had no answer.
I started asking that question
of groups of firefighters during lectures I gave around the country. The
answers I received quite often was no, architects, engineers and code officials
are not friends of the firefighter. Some firefighters would say, "I don't
know." Very rarely would someone defend these design professionals.
Based on this very limited
sampling, it appears there is a small rift between the architectural,
engineering and code‑writing communities on one side and the fire service
community on the other side. This sentiment seems to be related to building
construction methods and material and building code changes incorporated into
buildings today. This is unusual because across the country engineering schools
(not architects or building code officials) often team up with their local fire
departments.
For example, Polytechnic
University in New York City, an engineering school, for many years has teamed
up with the FDNY and created a Center for
Fire Safety Engineering. In the 1970s, Polytechnic helped the FDNY
conduct full‑scale tests of high‑rise buildings and row frame
houses. Polytechnic engineers worked with us when writing building code changes
for high‑rise office buildings and today they are helping the FDNY
prepare for the 21 st century.
Also, fire protection engineers Glenn Corbett and Charles Jennings teach
at John Jay College, the fire science institute, and are single handedly
leading the way for an investigation of the World Trade Center collapse.
Twenty years ago, I was invited
to teach a course on fire protection design by Manhattan College's civil engineering
department. This was in response to the MGM‑Grand Hotel fire in Nevada.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts is the premier fire protection
engineering school in the nation. And the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA), whose membership consists largely of architects and engineers, provides
most of the fire protection literature and technical information to the fire
service.
So why, with all this
interaction, is there a misunderstanding between the firefighter and the
architects, engineers and code officials of this country? What could possibly
be bothering the fire service? Why is there an edge in my voice when I speak
about safety and survival on the fireground?
‑ Lightweight
construction. One
of the reasons for this rift between the firefighter and the engineering
community possibly involves lightweight construction. One firefighter dies
every 18 months in the collapse of a burning building constructed with
lightweight wood construction. This widespread use of lightweight wood truss
construction and especially the connecter used to fasten members of this light truss together
are concerns to the firefighter.
Instead of standard‑size
nails or bolts used to connect the trusses, so‑called "sheet metal
surface fasteners" of random sizes and shapes are used. This sheet metal
surface fastener only penetrates the wood surface only to one‑quarter to
one‑half of an inch. Architects, engineers and code officials are looked
on by some firefighters as promoting this deadly construction, At least very
few architects engineers or code officials have spoken out against this
lightweight construction.
‑ NFPA
misunderstanding. There are architects and engineers from an organization called the
"NFPA" who go around the country lecturing on the fire departments'
misconceptions and exaggerations of the dangers of lightweight truss
construction. Firefighters, including myself, mistakenly think the initials
NFPA stand for National Fire Protection Association. An official of the
National Fire Protection Association informed me in no uncertain terms that
this products association had no affiliation with their organization. The NFPA
representatives who sometimes follow Frank Brannigan and myself around the
country, saying we exaggerate the dangers of trusses, actually belong to an
organization called the "National Forest Products Association." Hence
the initials NFPA.
‑ Wooden 1‑beams.
Another new
design in building construction unfairly blamed on architects, engineers and
code officials is the wooden I‑beam. This lightweight beam is composition
wood beam, constructed of a 2x4, as a top and bottom flange attached to a piece
of particleboard acting as a web member. This composition floor and roof
support is shaped as an I beam. A so‑called "silent floor beam"
supported a structure where two firefighters were recently killed when a floor
collapsed.
‑ Steel bar joist
truss construction. The lightweight steel bar joist was used to support floors in the World
Trade Center. This floor support is another form of lightweight floor and roof
construction used throughout the country that has the fire service alarmed and
is mistakenly blamed on architects, engineers and code officials. When
unprotected, lightweight bar joist beams can fail within five to 10 minutes of fire
exposure. The World Trade Center, constructed by the Port Authority, was the
only high‑rise office building in New York City to use lightweight bar
joist construction in high‑rise office building construction.
* Sheet metal C‑beams.
Another type
of lightweight construction is the C beam. This floor and roof beam is a thin
piece of sheet metal bent in the shape of a long, thin C. This steel beam uses
the bent shape to give it an increase in load bearing capability while reducing
the actual amount of steel used in the steel member. Firefighters are holding
breath waiting to see how this new structure reacts to fire and collapse.
‑ Fire protection of
steel. Since
the 1960s, builders have used fluffy sprayed‑on fire protection covering
steel. Instead of the heavy concrete encasement as used in pre World War 11
fire‑resistive buildings, a
lightweight mineral fiber is sprayed on steel to protect it from fire. The
change to spray‑on fire protection of steel has been fought by the fire
service since its introduction in the New York City building codes. FDNY Chief
John O'Hagan in 1976 outlined the problems in his book High Rise Fire and
Life Safety
1. The spray‑on slurry is
often not mixed properly.
2. The steel is not prepared
properly to allow the spray‑on material to stick properly.
3. Workers do not apply the
spray‑on material evenly.
4. Other workers doing
subsequent work nearby easily remove the critically important fire protection.
Again, I believe the
architects, engineering and code‑ writing community is being unfairly
blamed for this inadequate fire protection.
Builders Or Designers?
Several months ago, I wrote an
article about the fire vulnerability of lightweight building materials. I
stated responsibility belonged to "builders." A contractor called me
and said I should not blame "builders." Builders have to erect a
structure the way the architect and or engineer directs. Architects and
engineers state they are not responsible because they must build the structure
the way the owner and building code directs. The term they use is "client
driven."
Architects, engineers and code
officials are not solely responsible for this revolution in construction
methods and materials. There are building owners, designers and manufacturers,
and product sales representatives who introduce these products, which are
becoming deadly for the firefighters and occupants in a burning building.
Some other building code
changes that have firefighters questioning the fire safety concerns of design
professional are the following:
‑ Fire‑resistive
construction. The
concept of a fire‑resistive building has been allowed to slip way. At one
time, a fire‑resistive building was a structure that ‑ barring a
collapse or explosion ‑ would confine a fire to one floor. This is no
longer true. In the 1970s, New York had a two‑floor fire in I New York
Plaza; in the 1980s, Los Angles had a five‑floor fire in the First
Interstate Bank building; and in the 1990s, the I Meridian Plaza building in
Philadelphia suffered a nine‑floor fire. So, today there is no longer a
fire‑resistive building. If sprinklers or firefighters do not extinguish
the fire, the building will not confine it.
‑ Evacuation of
occupants. Stair
design and capacity still is based on the fact that a building is fire resistive
and so fire will be confined to one floor; therefore, stairs need not have to
have capacity to hold all the people of the building. Stairs are designed to
allow only a limited number of people to leave a building. Remember the Titanic
and the limited number of lifeboats? The rest must stay in place during the
fire. This is a so called "defend‑in‑place" firefighting
strategy, and it is based on the building being fire resistive, which many in
the fire service (including me) believe is no longer true.
‑ Large open‑floor‑area
design. Client‑driven
architects and engineers have constructed buildings of a size that is beyond
the control of firefighters using hose streams. These buildings contain 30,000
to 40,000 square feet of open floor space. Designers did not know or care that
a typical fire company can extinguish only about 2,500 square feet of fire. If
these buildings are not protected with a functioning automatic sprinklers,
firefighters cannot extinguish a fire inside these large‑area structures.
‑ Floor construction. The use of a four‑inch
concrete floor over corrugated steel I‑beams has failed at every multiple alarm fire in New
York City. Floor steel beam supports sag, warp and twist. The four‑inch
concrete floor above sags with the steel cracks and heaves. Smoke and flames
spread to the floor above. Floor beams and concrete floor surface must be
replaced after every serious fire. This started at the 1970s fire in 1 New York
Plaza, where 130 steel floor beams were replaced and 20,000 square feet of concrete
floor was removed. It continues to happen today. For example, in a fire in 1993
at the Bankers Trust building on Park Avenue, floors were seriously damaged and
had to be shored up before firefighters could enter, perform salvage and
overhaul the smoldering offices.
‑ Scissor stairs. The scissor stair is another
innovation design recently incorporated in the building codes. The enclosing of
two stairs in one enclosure is a cost saving item that the firefighter is
concerned about, especially since the stair enclosures can now be constructed
of two layers of sheetrock instead of masonry. Engineers now say they want to
"harden" the construction of high‑rise buildings since the
second terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Someone has been
"softening" buildings for the past 50 years. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), in its investigation, stated that the stairways of
the World Trade Center buildings were clustered together in the core area. In
pre‑World War 11 buildings stair ways were required by law to be located on remote
portions of a large floor area. This way, if fire blocked one exit, occupants
could go to another remote area of the floor and find an exit. Exit stairways
used to be at each end of a floor area. The New York City building code written
in 1968 defined the meaning of the term "remote" when it applied to
exit stairs. The building code defined exits "remote" if they were
over 15 feet away from each other.
‑ Controlled
inspections. Another
innovation in the 1968 building code was the "controlled inspection."
Building or fire officials need not always go to a construction site to inspect
a process or material. Rather, a‑called "controlled inspection"
is allowed. This is accomplished when an architect or engineer sends a written
affidavit to the building department that the material or process has been
inspected and meets the building code requirements. The "controlled
inspection" cuts down on the chance of bribery, but some say it is the fox
guarding the hen house.
‑ Shortcuts in
construction. I
was recently talking to a reporter about some of the above construction
techniques and she interrupted with alarm in her voice. "Are you talking
about shortcuts in construction?" I laughed and said, "Heck,
no." They are legal. They are sometimes associated with terms like
"the bottom line." "fast track," "client driven"
and "affordable housing." They do not break any building codes. They
are perfectly legal. They live up the "letter of the law."
The Voice Of The Fire
Service
At a lecture, a firefighter
asked, "Who speaks for the fire service? Where does the official voice for
the firefighter come from?" He stated that when there is a large‑scale
fire and collapse, the architect can look to the American Institute of
Architects (AIA) for an official explanation as to what happened. The engineer
can consult the Society of Civil Engineers (SCE) to obtain an official
engineering explanation. Code officials, I am sure, have associations that
provide an official view of a building disaster.
But to whom do firefighters
look to for an explanation of a disaster? Where does the fire protection point
of view come from? Someone suggested the fire protection point of view comes
from the National Fire Protection Association. Another firefighters said no,
they repeat the view held by architects and engineers, they do not speak for
firefighters.
One firefighter said,
"Chief, I know where the firefighter goes to for an official explanation
when firefighters are killed. When firefighters are killed, we go to the widows
of firefighters." The families of dead firefighters are the voice of the fire service ".